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1979] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE OF
COURT
CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii): Out-of-state conversion deemed sufficient pred-
icate for asserting in personam jurisdiction over nonresident
defendant
Despite the absence of any direct contact with the State of New
York, CPLR § 302(a)(3)(ii)1 extends in personam jurisdiction over
CPLR 302 establishes the predicates for exercising in personam jurisdiction over non-
domiciliaries. As originally enacted, CPLR 302(a) stated:
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. A court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, as to a cause
of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, in the same
manner as if he were a domiciliary of the state, if, in person or through an agent,
he:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of
action for defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the
state.
Ch. 308, [19621 N.Y. Laws 1315. Interpreting paragraph (2), the Court of Appeals in Feathers
v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965), held that an in-state injury
resulting from a defendant's tortious act outside the state was not sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of committing a tortious act within the state. Relying upon the statute's legisla-
tive history and the express language of CPLR 302(a)(2) that a nondomiciliary "commit a
tortious act within the state," the Feathers Court determined that the problem of out-of-state
tortious acts causing injury within the state was an issue to be addressed by the legislature.
15 N.Y.2d at 464, 209 N.E.2d at 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 24. Professor Reese, in a report to the
New York Judicial Conference, recommended that the statute be extended to reach nondomi-
ciliaries whose acts or omissions without the state caused tortious injury within the state, and
suggested that such an extension should be conditioned on the nonresident's intention that
the act have consequences within the state or that the nonresident should foresee such
consequences. Alternatively, the presence of other contacts with the state could make such
an exercise of jurisdiction reasonable. See Reese, A Study of CPLR 302 in Light of Recent
Judicial Decisions, ELEVENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. CONFERENCE 132, 135-36 (1966). Professor
Reese's study prompted the Judicial Conference to propose the present CPLR 302(a)(3).
FoumTH ANN. REP. OF THE JuD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1966), reprinted in [1966] N.Y.
Laws 2780 (McKinney). CPLR 302 (a)(3) was adopted in 1966. Ch. 590, [1966] N.Y. Laws
1347. Thus, New York extends jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who:
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or prop-
erty within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character
arising from the act, if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course
of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the
state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce
Id. at 1348.
Even with the 1966 amendment, CPLR 302 apparently does not extend the reach of the
state's jurisdiction to the extent permitted constitutionally. E.g., American Eutectic Welding
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nondomiciliaries whose out-of-state tortious acts result in foreseea-
ble injury to person or property within the state,2 provided that the
nonresident derives "substantial revenue" from international or in-
terstate commerce. 3 Enacted in response to the lack of statutory
authority for asserting jurisdiction over parties who send defective
products into the state,4 the statute's application to commercial
Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d 423, 435 (1971) (citing FouRTH ANN. REP.
OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1966), reprinted in [1966] N.Y. Laws 2780, 2789
(McKinney); CPLR 302, commentary at 60 (1972). Indeed, the requirement in CPLR
302(a)(3)(ii) that a defendant derive substantial revenue from interstate or international
commerce renders it more restrictive than the Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-411(c)(3)
(West 1977), and North Carolina statutes. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a)(3) (1975). See note 3
infra. For a general discussion of the legislative history and application of CPLR 302, see
Homburger & Laufer, Expanding Jurisdiction over Foreign Torts: The 1966 Amendment of
New York's Long-Arm Statute, 16 BuFpALo L. REv. 67 (1966); Siegel, Conflict of Laws, 19
SYRAcUSE L. REv. 235, 235-45 (1967); Legislation, CPLR - Personal Jurisdiction over Non-
Domiciliaries Who Commit Tortious Acts Outside New York, 33 BROOKLYN L. REv. 107
(1966); Note, Jurisdiction in New York: A Proposed Reform, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 1412 (1969).
2 CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) does not require a nonresident to foresee the specific injury within
the state, but rather, general consequences of his activities must be foreseeable. See Tracy
v. Paragon Contact Lens Labs., Inc., 44 App. Div. 2d 455, 458, 355 N.Y.S.2d 650, 652-53 (3d
Dep't 1974); Gonzales v. Harris Calorific Co., 64 Misc. 2d 287, 291, 315 N.Y.S.2d 51, 56 (Sup.
Ct. Orange County 1968), aff'd mem., 35 App. Div. 2d 720, 315 N.Y.S.2d 815 (2d Dep't 1970);
FOURTH ANN. REP. OF THE Juw. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1966), reprinted in [19661 N.Y.
Laws 2780, 2790 (McKinney). The foreseeability test is an objective standard of whether a
reasonably prudent man would expect his tortious act to have consequences in New York.
See Allen v. Auto Specialties Mfg. Co., 45 App. Div. 2d 331, 333, 357 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550 (3d
Dep't 1974); Brown v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R. Co., 54 Misc. 2d 225, 227, 282 N.Y.S.2d 335,
337 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1967).
The "substantial revenue" test is designed to extend the reach of the statute only to
those nondomiciliaries whose business activities are non-local and extensive in nature so that
no unfair burden will be imposed on nonresidents whose contact with the state is limited or
remote. See FOURTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1966), reprinted in
[1966] N.Y. Laws 2780, 2788-89 (McKinney). Such limitation also is designed to prevent
discouragement of commerce with the state. 1 WK&M 302.01. CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii), however,
does not require a connection between the tortious act and the derivation of substantial
revenue from interstate or international commerce. See Gonzales v. Harris Calorific Co., 64
Misc. 2d 287, 291, 315 N.Y.S.2d 51, 56 (Sup. Ct. Queens County), aff'd mem., 35 App. Div.
2d 720, 315 N.Y.S.2d 815 (2d Dep't 1970); Brown v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R. Co., 54 Misc. 2d
225, 227, 282 N.Y.S.2d 335, 337 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1967); Gillmore v. J.S. Inskip, Inc.,
54 Misc. 2d 218, 221, 282 N.Y.S.2d 127, 132 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967); FOURTH ANN.
REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1966), reprinted in [19661 N.Y. Laws 2780, 2790
(McKinney). Moreover, unlike the in-state transaction of business and tort requirements
under CPLR 302(a)(1) and (2), no connection is required between New York and the location
from which the nondomiciliary generates revenue, provided the revenue is derived from
interstate or international trade and is substantial. See, e.g., Allen v. Auto Specialties Mfg.
Co., 45 App. Div. 2d 331, 333, 357 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550 (3d Dep't 1974).
See Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel, 61 App. Div. 2d 697, 701, 403 N.Y.S.2d 931, 933 (4th
Dep't), affl'd, 46 N.Y.2d 197, 385 N.E.2d 1055, 413 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1978); FOuRTH ANN. REp.
OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1966), reprinted in [1966] N.Y. Laws 2780, 2787-88
(McKinney); CPLR 302, commentary at 84-86 (1972).
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torts has remained unclear.5 Recently, in Fantis Foods, Inc. v. Stan-
dard Importing Co., 6 the Appellate Division, First Department, held
that where a nondomiciliary who derives substantial revenue from
international commerce commits an out-of-state conversion, result-
ing in a foreseeable economic loss in New York, in personam juris-
diction may be obtained pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(3)(ii). 7
In Fantis, Standard Importing Co. (Standard), a New York
corporation which imports various foods, entered into a written
agreement in Greece with Synergal, Ltd. (Synergal) for four ship-
ments of feta cheese, f.o.b. Piraeus, Greece." Synergal, the dominant
exporter of Greek feta cheese, was organized under the laws of
Greece. Additionally, all of Synergal's offices were located in
Greece, and it maintained no offices, agents or assets in New York,
nor did it advertise or otherwise conduct business in the United
States.9 While the first shipment was in transit, Synergal allegedly
substituted the plaintiff, Fantis Foods, Inc. (Fantis), a New York
corporation and Standard's competitor, as the purchaser on the
original bill of lading."' Despite the substitution, Standard obtained
possession of the first shipment.1 Fantis commenced an action
against Standard for conversion of this shipment, and Standard
'The statute itself fails to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial torts, see
note 1 supra, and previous state court cases have dealt almost exclusively with negligence
and products liability. See, e.g., Tracy v. Paragon Contact Lens Labs., Inc., 44 App. Div. 2d
455, 355 N.Y.S.2d 650 (3d Dep't 1974); Newman v. Charles S. Nathan, Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 368,
284 N.Y.S.2d 688 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1967); Gillmore v. Inskip, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 218,
282 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967). Federal courts, however, have considered
the statute's commercial application and consistently have held that a commercial loss is
insufficient to invoke CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) where such injury is incurred within the state as a
fortuitous consequence of a plaintiff's domicile, incorporation, or doing business in New York.
See Lehigh Valley Indus., Inc. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 1975); American
Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d 428, 433 (2d Cir. 1971);
Friedr. Zoellner Corp. v. Tex Metals Co., 396 F.2d 300, 303 (2d Cir. 1968); Security Nat'l
Bank v. UBEX Corp., 404 F. Supp. 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Chemical Bank v. World
Hockey Ass'n, 403 F. Supp. 1374, 1380 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). For a discusssion of these cases, see
note 33 infra.
1 63 App. Div. 2d 52, 406 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1st Dep't 1978).
7 Id. at 56, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
8 Id. at 53-54, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 764. The contract provided that the buyer was to assume
responsibility for the cheese when it left the factory, and delivery was to be effected in the
factory or the refrigerated warehouses. Id. at 55, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 765. Payment was guaran-
teed under an irrevocable credit agreement established by Standard in favor of Synergal. Id.
at 54, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 764. After the cheese was marked with Standard's trademark and
segregated in Greece, Standard surrendered an attestation to the product's weight and qual-
ity to Synergal. Id. at 55, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 765.
Id. at 59, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 768 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 60, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 768 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 54, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
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impleaded Synergal, alleging breach of contract and conversion of
the last three shipments.'2 Synergal moved to dismiss the third-
party action, contending that there was no predicate for the exercise
of in personam jurisdiction.'3 The Supreme Court, New York
County, denied the motion and held that Synergal was subject to
jurisdiction under New York's long-arm statute."
In affirming, a divided appellate division'5 found that Syner-
gal's diversion of the shipment to Fantis "clearly sound[ed] in
tort."" Justice Lupiano, writing for the majority, noted that when
CPLR § 302(a) (3)(ii) was enacted, it was "primarily aimed at negli-
gence type situations involving personal injuries or property dam-
age.' 7 The court reasoned, however, that application of the statute
to commercial injuries should not be foreclosed since CPLR §
302(a)(3) fails to distinguish between commercial and noncommer-
cial injuries." After deciding this threshold issue, the court found
that the in-state injury requirement of CPLR § 302(a)(3)(ii) was
satisfied since Synergal's "tortious act [had] consequences in New
York."' 9 Noting that subparagraph (ii) requires a nondomiciliary to
foresee consequences of his tortious act within the state, 0 the Fantis
court observed that Synergal should have known that its conversion
would have consequences in New York because, in addition to Stan-
2 Id. By virtue of the express provisions of the contract, see note 8 supra, Standard
claimed it had become entitled to rightful possession of the cheese while it was in Greece and
that Synergal's alleged subsequent conveyance to Fantis constituted a conversion. Id. at 55,
406 N.Y.S.2d at 765.
'3 Id. at 54, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 764. Synergal also argued that Standard's only claim was
for breach of contract, to which CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) would be inapplicable. Id. Furthermore,
Synergal contended that, pursuant to the forum selection clause in the purchase contract,
the defendant had agreed to settle disputes in Greek courts. Id.
I /d.
In a 3-2 decision, Justices Kuperman and Lane concurred with Justice Lupiano to form
the majority. Justice Sullivan dissented in an opinion in which Justice Sandler joined.
1 Id. at 55, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 765; see note 13 supra.
17 63 App. Div. 2d at 57, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 766. See notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text
supra.
8 63 App. Div. 2d at 57, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 766. The court rejected the reasoning of several
federal cases where CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) was applied more restrictively to torts in the commer-
cial area. See note 33 infra.
1 63 App. Div. 2d at 56, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 766. The court stated that the "most essential
condition" under CPLR 302(a)(3) is that injury be sustained in New York. Id. at 55, 406
N.Y.S.2d at 765. Although failing to elaborate on the injury requirement of CPLR 302(a)(3)
in its opinion, the court stated in a footnote that "the conversion directly injured Standard
in its economic relations in New York" since, in addition to damages incurred from the loss
of the cheese itself, Standard lost profits generally because the conversion to Fantis, its local
competitor, destroyed Standard's prospects for sales of Greek feta cheese. Id. at 57 n.2, 406
N.Y.S.2d at 766 n.2.
" Id. at 56, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 765-66.
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dard and Fantis being New York corporations, Synergal's mono-
polistic position in the export market enabled it to control competi-
tion between the two New York importers. 1 Thus, the court rejected
Synergal's argument and upheld the lower court's assertion of juris-
diction.12
The dissent maintained that Standard's claim only supported
a breach of contract action.23 Authoring the dissenting opinion, Jus-
tice Sullivan argued that any loss of profits was simply the conse-
quence of Standard's domicile.u Furthermore, since "the damage
coalesced with the tortious act," which occurred in Greece, any
injury incurred in New York was too remote to justify the court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Synergal.1 Viewing Synergal's
monopolistic position in relation to New York importers as merely
another aspect of domicile, Justice Sullivan reasoned that the
"minimum contacts" standard had not been satisfied.27 The dissent
concluded, therefore, that the assertion of personal jurisdiction in
this case was constitutionally impermissible.2
While it appears that the Fantis court properly held CPLR §
302(a)(3)(ii) applicable to commercial torts, 29 its application of the
22 Id. at 57, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
22 Id. The failure of Synergal to challenge the constitutionality of the statute at the trial
level precluded treatment of this issue on appeal, id. at 58, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 767, since statutes
are presumed constitutional, and the right to rebut such presumption must be exercised
either in the pleadings or at trial. Id.; accord, Dodge v. Cornelius, 168 N.Y. 242, 244-45, 61
N.E. 244, 245 (1901); Jahn v. Berzon, 255 App. Div. 1023, 1024, 8 N.Y.S.2d 640,642 (2d Dep't
1938).
" 63 App. Div. 2d at 60, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 768 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). Justice Sullivan
contended that a tort claim could be sustained only if Standard obtained a right to title in
Greece, and that this question was to be determined under Greek law. Id. at 61, 406 N.Y.S.2d
at 769 (Sullivan, J., dissenting); see M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220,
226, 186 N.E. 679, 682 (1933). Moreover, in view of Standard pleading the same facts in
support of both the tort and breach of contract claims, the dissent argued that Standard's
claim against Synergal for the balance of the shipment for which it bargained but failed to
receive sounded solely in contract. 63 App. Div. 2d at 61, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 769 (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting).
21 63 App. Div. 2d at 64, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 770-71 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 63, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 770 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 63-64, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 770-71 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 64, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 771 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
2 Id. (Sullivan, J., dissenting). The dissent expressed the fear that the majority's holding
would extend jurisdiction beyond the constitutional limits of International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), by allowing a nondomiciliary to be sued in New York merely
because a loss of profits appears on the corporation's records solely by reason of the plaintiff's
New York domicile. 63 App. Div. 2d at 64, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 771 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
29 In a case decided after Fantis, the Court of Appeals, in Sybron v. Wetzel, 46 N.Y.2d
197, 385 N.E.2d 1055, 413 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1978), applied CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) to a commercial
tort. Noting that since the preliminary studies and the expert draftsmen of the statute did
not exclude commercial torts, the Court concluded that the statute should be construed
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statute's jurisdictional requirements seems questionable. Before
long-arm jurisdiction may be obtained, the defendant must cause
an "injury to person or property within the state""0 and "reasonably
expect [his tortious] act to have consequences in the state."', The
Fantis court, while acknowledging the requirements of the statute,
apparently merged the foreseeable consequences and injury require-
ments. After finding loss of profits in New York to be a foreseeable
consequence of Synergal's tortious conduct, the court merely added
that the loss was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of injury
within the state. Since the injury requirement provides an impor-
tant nexus With the forum state,"2 the Fantis court should have
further explained its reasons for accepting loss of profits as an injury
within the meaning of the statute.3 The majority's conclusion, if
broadly. Id. at 205, 385 N.E.2d at 1085, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 131. The Sybron Court held that a
New York court could issue an injunction against a nondomiciliary where it was deemed
probable that the nondomiciliary's continued out-of-state conduct would eventually result in
the commission of a commercial tort causing injury within New York, provided such injury
was foreseeable and the nonresident was engaged in interstate or international commerce. Id.
at 204-06, 385 N.E.2d at 1059-60, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 132-33.
11 CPLR § 302(a)(3) (1972).
3, Id. § 302(a)(3)(ii). Before a court may exercise jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii),
four prerequisites must be satisfied. In addition to the two injury requirements, injurious
consequences within the state must have been foreseen or reasonably should have been
foreseen by the tortfeasor. Finally, the tortfeasor must be engaged in interstate or interna-
tional commerce and derive substantial revenue therefrom. D. SIEGEL, NEw YORK PRACTICE §
88, at 103-04 (1978). Regarding the second requirement of injury within the state, the courts,
in noncommercial cases, have "look[ed] to the imparting of the original injury within the
State of New York and not resultant damage." Black v. Oberle Rentals, Inc., 55 Misc. 2d
398, 400, 285 N.Y.S.2d 226, 229 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1967). Thus, a physical injury
incurred outside the state has been held insufficient to satisfy CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii)'s injury
requirement, even though the manifestations of the injury remain or develop when an injured
resident returns to New York. See, e.g., Kramer v. Hotel Los Monteros S.A., 57 App. Div.
2d 756, 394 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dep't 1977). It is submitted that in commercial tort cases a
similar standard should be employed. See note 38 and accompanying text infra.
32 FOURTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1966), reprinted in [19661
N.Y. Laws 2780, 2788 (McKinney); see note 34 infra.
3 See note 19 supra. The federal cases require that the injury within the state be direct,
and have deemed "the place where the plaintiff lost business" to be the situs of the injury,
American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d 428, 433 (2d
Cir. 1971) (quoting Spectacular Promotions, Inc. v. Radio Station WING, 272 F. Supp. 734,
737 (E.D.N.Y. 1967)), since the place where business is lost usually will be a forum reasonably
foreseeable to the tortfeasor and ordinarily the location of crucial events connected with the
disagreement. 439 F.2d at 433. Thus, where loss of profits results from a domiciliary's loss of
business outside the state, as, for example, where a foreign corporation induced salesmen to
leave the employ of a New York corporation and used confidential customer lists, federal
courts have viewed the injury within New York as merely the fortuitous result of the plaintiffs
domicile and too indirect to satisfy CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii)'s injury requirement. See, e.g., id. at
435. A virtual destruction of the plaintiff's New York business through a depletion of nonresi-
dent customers, however, might yield a different result. See id. In Friedr. Zoellner Corp. v.
Tex Metals Co., 278 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 396 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1968), the
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logically extended, would subject to the state's jurisdiction any non-
resident who enters into a contract with a New York domiciliary, if
it was foreseeable that a conversion would cause a loss of profits and
the nonresident derived substantial revenue from interstate or inter-
national commerce.3'
The difficulties presented by the Fantis opinion may stem from
the fact that the tort of conversion does not lend itself to the juris-
dictional analysis traditionally employed in personal injury ac-
tions. 5 When a defective product is sent into the state, the tort is
district court held that where the defendant had absolutely no contacts with New York and
did not enjoy the benefits and privileges of the laws of the state, the "minimum contacts"
standard was not satisfied and the defendant was not subject to jurisdiction under CPLR
302(a)(3)(ii). 278 F. Supp. at 56; see Security Nat'l Bank v. UBEX Corp., 404 F. Supp. 471
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Chemical Bank v. World Hockey Ass'n, 403 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Lehigh Valley Indus., Inc. v. Birenbaum, 389 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y.), affl'd, 527 F.2d 87 (2d
Cir. 1975). In each of these federal cases, the "balance sheet" loss of profits was not attributa-
ble to a corresponding reduction in the volume of business within New York.
11 See 63 App. Div. 2d at 64, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 771 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). Although
the Fantis court did not reach the constitutional issue, see note 22 supra, CPLR 302(a)(3)
appears to be well within constitutional bounds. See note 1 supra. It is submitted, however,
that the Fantis court's application of the statute fails to satisfy the "minimum contacts"
standard set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Under CPLR
302(a)(3)(ii), the only contacts with the state are the injury and a contract with a New York
corporation. While the foreseeability and revenue requirements are important limitations on
the state's exercise of jurisdiction, see FoURT ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFEIIENCE ON THE
CPLR (1966), reprinted in [19661 N.Y. Laws 2780, 2789 (McKinney), neither necessarily
provides any tangible contact with New York. See notes 2 & 3 supra. Thus, the satisfaction
of the injury requirement is critical, especially since the tortious act is not committed within
the state.
The "minimum contacts" standard requires that "the defendant purposefully [avail]
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,319 (1945). In Gray v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 11. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), the Illinois Supreme Court
interpreted § 17 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1978), upon which CPLR 302 is based. See WK&M 302.01. The Gray court found
that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that its defective product manufactured
in Ohio would find its way into Illinois and produce consequences therein. Reasoning that
the presence of defendant's product in the state was not an isolated instance and that the
product was sold with the knowledge that it might be used in Illinois, the court held that the
defendant had invoked the benefits and protections of the laws of Illinois. Consequently, the
defendant's contacts with the state did not make it unfair to require the defendant to defend
an action brought therein. 22 ill. 2d at 437, 176 N.E.2d at 766. It is submitted that, unlike
the Gray defendant, Synergal did not invoke the benefits and protections of the laws of New
York. Assuming arguendo that injury was incurred in the United States despite the conver-
sion in Greece, see notes 35 & 37 and accompanying text infra, it appears that Standard would
lose customers in the Chicago area, since the shipments were destined for Chicago. Thus, if
Synergal invoked the benefits and protections of the laws of any state, it received the benefits
of the laws of Illinois, not New York.
" In negligence and strict liability cases, the tortious act occurs when the product is
manufactured outside the state. When it is later shipped into the state where it causes
1979]
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not complete until the product causes an injury to person or prop-
erty." In conversion, on the other hand, the tortious act and injury
occur simultaneously, and the tort is complete when the goods are
converted.3 7 Thus, the injury occurs wherever the tortious act takes
place. In Fantis, since the conversion took place in Greece, no injury
was incurred in New York." The loss of profits, which the Fantis
court treated as an in-state injury for purposes of CPLR §
302(a)(3)(ii), appears to be more appropriately termed a conse-
quence of the injury suffered in Greece.
It is submitted that the failure of the Fantis court to evaluate
the distinctions peculiar to the tort of conversion resulted in an
exercise of jurisdiction which is predicated primarily upon the
plaintiff's domicile.3 1 When applied to commercial torts, CPLR §
302(a)(3)(ii) should be examined in light of the nature of the tort
committed, since this may be relevant to whether the injury require-
ment is satisfied. Without such consideration, the courts may ex-
tend the state's jurisdiction beyond the limits permitted by due
process.
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personal injury or property damage, the tort is completed in New York. If the manufacturer
can foresee ramifications within the state and is substantially engaged in interstate or inter-
national commerce, jurisdiction may be exercised pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii). See, e.g.,
Newman v. Charles S. Nathan, Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 368, 370, 285 N.Y.S.2d 688, 690 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1967). This is the classic application of CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) contemplated by
the drafters. See FOURTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1966), reprinted
in [1966] N.Y. Laws 2780, 2788 (McKinney). It has been held, however, that jurisdiction is
not obtained under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) where a defective product manufactured outside the
state causes injury to New York domiciliaries while they are outside the state. See, e.g., Black
v. Oberle Rentals, Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 398, 285 N.Y.S.2d 226 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1967).
In such a situation the tort is completed outside the state. Accordingly, any loss of earnings
or other damages incurred are deemed consequential since they stem from the original per-
sonal injury and occur in New York solely because the injured party is domiciled here. Id. at
400, 285 N.Y.S.2d 226, 229. This situation is analogous to cases involving the tort of conver-
sion where the tort is complete when the goods are converted. See note 37 and accompanying
text infra. Thus, any loss of profits is similar to loss of earnings in a personal injury case.
3' See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 2 (4th ed. 1971). Indeed, the Court of Appeals, in
Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965), distinguished
between "tortious act" and "tort," noting that they do not always occur at the same time
and place. Id. at 463, 209 N.E.2d at 79, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 23.
" See PROSSER, supra note 36, at 84, 97 (4th ed. 1971).
u If the theoretical argument can be circumvented it may be argued that the injury
occurred where Standard lost sales or customers, see note 34 supra, since actual loss of
customers or sales is more likely to be considered a direct "injury" than a mere balance sheet
loss of profits. Even if this line of reasoning is pursued, however, it appears as though Stan-
dard would have lost customers or sales in Chicago, where the shipments were to be delivered.
31 See note 35 supra.
